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"Jobs Americans Won't Do": Our Farming




Juana and Miguel Lopez board up their house in Brownsville,
Texas at the beginning of May every year, in case hurricanes
should come before they return. Their children Deyanira and Jos6
take final exams a month early, then help their parents pack up
the van for the fourteen-hundred-mile trip north to Minnesota.
The Lopez family drives north, paying for gasoline with their tax
refund checks and hoping floods, droughts, or mechanization won't
steal their livelihood this year. They begin the season by hand-
picking rocks from the fields, then weeding lettuce, then proces-
sing snap peas, then shucking corn. Every member of the family,
from fourteen-year-old Deyanira to the seventy-eight-year-old
grandmother Guadalupe, works on the farm, hoping that this year
they will be paid in full, that this season they will leave Minnesota
without an occupational injury, and that this summer they will
breathe air free of pesticides while toiling under the northern
sun. 1
Immigration reform has been in the political eye for the past
decade and most of the proposed legislation has included tempo-
rary guest worker programs. 2 The rationale behind such guest
t. J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
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F. Befort and David S. Weissbrodt, as well as the Journal of Law and Inequality's
editorial staff, including J.J. Kuhicek, Brianna Mooty, and Catherine London. I am
grateful for my students at Simon Rivera High School in Brownsville, Texas, for
inspiring me to attend law school and advocate for social justice. I am also deeply
indebted to the staff at Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services (SMRLS).
Most importantly, I thank my wife Katherine McKee for her constant support.
1. The story of the Lopez family was pieced together from the author's
experiences as a teacher in Texas and as a migrant farmworker advocate with
Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services in and around Rochester, Minnesota
in June 2009.
2. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32044, IMMIGRATION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS 1 (2009)
(describing the various guest worker programs proposed in the 109th, 110th, and
111th Congresses). Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits, and Security Act of
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worker programs is often that temporary immigrants will perform
"jobs Americans won't do," 3 namely manual labor such as
janitorial services and farmwork, and that nonimmigrant visas
should be granted in order to fill these necessary occupations.
While comprehensive immigration reform is necessary, few have
looked deeper into the reasons why Americans refuse to perform
agricultural labor, an industry uniquely protected throughout
American history and long considered a bedrock of American
industry. 4
The reason Americans will not weed fields, pick vegetables,
or shuck corn is not that these jobs are necessarily more physically
demanding than other blue-collar occupations.5 The real rationale
is that, despite the United States' extensive worker protections in
virtually every other industry, the domestic and immigrant
farmworkers who harvest our nation's crops are woefully under-
protected by the current mishmash of legislation.6 Part I of this
Article explores the American family farm and the farmworker
legislation that sustains its cheap and reliable labor force, while
Part II explains the persistent and ongoing hardships of our
nation's farmworkers. Part III of this Article examines numerous
statutes that fail to adequately protect farmworkers in the same
way as laborers in other industries, including the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act of 1983 (MSAWPA).7
Part IV analyzes state and international alternatives to the
current feeble federal farmworker protections, and Part V suggests
ways Congress can amend MSAWPA in order to end unequal
treatment of farmworkers.
2009, the latest incarnation of comprehensive immigration reform, has been
referred to legislative committees. Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits, and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2414, 111th Cong. (2009).
3. Jonathan Weisman, Senate Republicans Agree on Immigration Bill: Wide
Bipartisan Support Would Break Logjam, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2006, at A19
(describing President George W. Bush's advocacy for "a bill that will include a
guest-worker provision . . . [and] will recognize that there are people here working
hard for jobs Americans won't do. . . .").
4. Agriculture's uniqueness is embodied in the Jeffersonian ideal of a
confederacy of family farms; the Framers were, after all, farmers. See DON
PAARLBERG, FARM AND FOOD POLICY: ISSUES OF THE 1980S 5 (1980) ("Farmers were
considered uniquely worthy. . . . producing food, the most needed product of all.
Farmers were considered good God-fearing citizens, stalwart defenders of the
republic, and a stabilizing element in the society.").
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part III.
7. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (2006)).
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I. Hired Hands: Domestic and Guest Workers in the Fields
A. The Changing Faces of Farmworkers
The United States is often dubbed a "nation of immigrants," 8
but it is also, most decidedly, a country of internal migration. The
United States has one of the highest mobility rates in the deve-
loped world.9 Throughout the 1980s, between sixteen and twenty
percent of the United States population changed residences each
year.10 Between 1995 and 2000, over 22 million people moved
from one state to another.11 While immigrant farmworkers are
stereotypically associated with farm work and do indeed comprise
a large portion of the American agricultural workforce, domestic
migrants have been a cornerstone of American harvests for more
than a century. 12
African Americans had long labored as farmworkers in the
South, but in the beginning of the twentieth century hundreds of
thousands moved to northern cities, draining the southern fields of
their longstanding workforce.13 As the world wars diminished
much of the U.S. working population, guest worker programs were
established to maintain cheap labor for American farmers.14 The
first Mexican guest worker program began in 1917; in the
program's first four years, 72,000 workers entered the United
States.15 After the war, authorized and unauthorized workers
crossed the border, filling the void created by the restrictive 1924
Immigration Act, or National Origins Act, which essentially halted
8. Immigration and the Labor Force, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (1980).
9. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-45, ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL CHILDREN: MANY CHANGE SCHOOLs FREQUENTLY, HARMING THEIR
EDUCATION 1 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.govit2pbat4/150724.pdf ("The
United States has one of the highest mobility rates of all developed countries;
annually, about one-fifth of all Americans move.").
10. DAVID KERBOW, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON THE EDUC. OF STUDENTS PLACED AT
RISK, PATTERNS OF URBAN STUDENT MOBILITY AND LOCAL SCHOOL REFORM 6
(1996).
11. RACHEL S. FRANKLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DOMESTIC MIGRATION ACROSS
REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES: 1995 TO 2000 1 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-7.pdf.
12. See DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF
MIGRANT FARMWORKERS TODAY 31-34 (2000) (detailing the history and
characteristics of farmworkers from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth
century).
13. See Carole Marks, Lines of Communication, Recruitment Mechanisms, and
the Great Migration of 1916-1918, 31 Soc. PROBS. 1, 1 (1983).
14. See Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and
Historic Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, 426-29
(2005).
15. Id. at 426-27.
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all Asian and Eastern European immigration while permitting
labor movement within the Western Hemisphere.16 This influx of
workers continued until the Great Depression and New Deal,
when the Bureau of Immigration forcibly "repatriated" thousands
of Mexican and Mexican American workers. 17
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal heralded
newfound protections for American workers and social welfare for
the poor, but it largely ignored the plight of poor farmworkers in
need of similar reforms.18 New Deal programs failed to address
the systematic abuses of farmworkers and effectively "institution-
alized the second-class status of agricultural laborers."19 When
discussing the protection of farmworkers through wage and hour
laws in Congress, Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture,
reportedly exclaimed "We can't touch that. It's dynamite!"20 The
very idea of legislation favoring farmworkers was incendiary,
largely due to farmworkers' race and ethnicity. 21 In a time when
social welfare programs were the agenda, legislation favoring the
class of largely African American sharecropping farmworkers was
tabled in order to secure southern Democrats' pivotal votes, 22
16. Id. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 126-34 (2006) for an in-
depth analysis of the National Origins Act and its effect on Asian American
immigrants.
17. Gilbert, supra note 14, at 427 (explaining that many of those affected by the
Bureau of Immigration's repatriation program were actually legal U.S. citizens and
not Mexican citizens who had illegally entered the United States).
18. Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits
Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 575, 582 (2001) (detailing the ways in which New Deal legislation denied
farmworkers important rights that were granted to other workers). New Deal
reforms such as the right to collective bargaining, the right to minimum and
overtime wages, and the right to a safe workplace improved working conditions for
every American worker except the agricultural laborer. Id.
19. ROTHENBERG, supra note 12, at 205.
20. DWIGHT MACDONALD, HENRY WALLACE: THE MAN AND THE MYTH 48 (2d ed.
1948).
21. See OXFAM AM., LIKE MACHINES IN THE FIELDS: WORKERS WITHOUT RIGHTS
IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 1, 39 (2004), available at
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/like-machines-in-the-fields.pdf.
Racial prejudice has also played an important role in excluding
farmworkers from the protections of labor laws. Like other manual
laborers, farmworkers have often been ethnic minorities or immigrants.
The migrant farmworker population was predominantly made up of
African Americans before 1960 and, since then, is increasingly made up of
recent immigrants and foreign guest workers from Latin America.
Id.
22. See Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1348-53 (1987) (explaining
that the lack of farmworker legislation was a direct result of southern racism).
252 [Vol. 29:249
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which were necessary for other New Deal reforms. 23 As a direct
result of the New Deal's failure to remedy agricultural employ-
ment concerns, farmworkers earning just seventy percent of the
industrial wage rate in the early 1900s earned only twenty-five
percent of that rate by 1940.24
B. The Fallow Fields of Family Farming
Despite a national policy of agricultural protectionism, the
number of family farms has steadily declined. 25 In 1990, the rural
population was only 25% of the total U.S. population as compared
to 43.7% of the population in 1930 and 95% in 1790.26
Agricultural workers now account for less than two percent of the
U.S. labor force, consisting of some 1.01 million hired farmworkers
and 2.05 million farmers and family members. 27 Small farms still
account for over ninety percent of all farms, but less than thirty
percent of all agricultural production.28
As temporary guest worker programs ceased, agribusiness
consolidated agriculture, and small farms were increasingly
crunched for cash, family farms began hiring domestic migrant
farmworkers and unauthorized immigrant workers. 29 Although
both migrant and seasonal farmworkerS 30 are a necessary part of
agricultural work today, they only find farm work thirty-two to
23. Id. Additionally, the industrial workers of the North belonged to powerful
unions that could lobby for their interests, while farmworkers lacked any such
organizational structure until long after World War II. See infra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
24. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 12, at 35.
25. See Guadalupe T. Luna, "Agricultural Underdogs" and International
Agreements: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy,
26 N.M. L. REV. 9, 44-47 (1996) (discussing the decline in small- and moderate-
sized farms and the growth in large corporate farms).
26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-251242, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: PROFILE
OF RURAL AREAS 7-8 (1993).
27. WILLIAM KANDEL, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PROFILE OF HIRED FARMWORKERS,
A 2008 UPDATE 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
err60/err60.pdf.
28. Id. at 3. Small farms are classified as those making less than $250,000
annually. Id.
29. See Holley, supra note 18, at 583-92 (depicting the shift to agricultural
guest workers in the United States).
30. Migrant agricultural workers are defined as those working seasonally or
temporarily on farm work which requires them to be absent overnight from their
permanent place of residence, while seasonal agricultural workers are not required




thirty-six weeks of the year and it is difficult for them to find work
out of season.31
II. Hardships of the Harvest
Farm laborers are excluded from minimum wage legislation
and from unemployment insurance, and are at a disadvantage
where social security is concerned. They are denied the
collective bargaining rights guaranteed to non-farmworkers,
and are effectively cut off from every benefit of a negotiated
contract.32
On Thanksgiving Day 1960, Edward R. Murrow broadcast
the documentary Harvest of Shame on primetime television. 33 The
documentary showed the public, for the first time since John
Steinbeck's novel The Grapes of Wrath,34 the daily hardships
endured by farmworkers in order to put food on America's table.
In his journalistic style, Murrow depicted these "workers in the
sweatshops of the soil, the harvest of shame."3 5  Sadly, as
Murrow's documentary turns fifty, farmworkers like the Lopez
family continue to face many of the same unresolved issues, such
as low wages, widespread workplace injuries, and dangerous
exposure to pesticides and herbicides.
A. Noncompetitive Wages for a Vulnerable Workforce
"We used to own our slaves, now we just rent them."36
Poverty among farmworkers is more than double that of all
wage and salary employees in the United StateS37 and farmworker
wages have consistently been much lower than wages in similar
blue-collar industries. 38 In 1967, farmworkers were the lowest-
paid laborers, 39 and in 2001 hired farmworkers like Juana and
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2001-2002: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE
OF UNITED STATES FARM WORKERS 25 (2005).
32. 91 CONG. REC. H28576 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1969) (statement of C~sar ChAvez).
33. CBS Reports: Harvest of Shame (CBS television broadcast Nov. 26, 1960).
34. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (Penguin Books 1976) (1939).
35. CBS Reports: Harvest of Shame, supra note 33.
36. Id. (quoting an unidentified Florida farmer).
37. KANDEL, supra note 27, at iv.
38. Jack L. Runyan, Hired Farmworkers' Earnings Increased in 2001 but Still
Trail Most Occupations, RURAL AM., Fall 2002, at 67-68.
39. Letter from Loice Lance, migrant farmworker, to Hon. Harrison A.
Williams, Subcomm. on Migrant Labor (Dec. 6, 1967), in Migratory Labor
Legislation: Hearing on S. 8, S. 195, S. 197, and S. 198 Before the Subcomm. on
Migratory Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong. 326 (1967)
("Farm industry is the largest industry in the United States and the Farm Laborer
is the lowest paid.").
254 [Vol. 29:249
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Miguel Lopez were working in the second-lowest-paid occupation
in the United States. 40 As of 2006, the median wage for non-
supervisory farmworkers was $6.75/hour 4l and $350/week. 42
Farmworkers are also routinely cheated out of overtime pay and
unlikely to earn tips or commissions. 43
B. Harm on the Farm
The low wages farmworkers receive belie the dangerous
nature of the work. In 2007, agriculture earned the dubious honor
of being the most dangerous industry sector in the United States
in terms of its occupational fatality ratio.44 From 1992 to 2006,
sixty-eight crop workers died from heat stroke, "representing a
rate nearly 20 times greater than for all U.S. civilian workers." 45
In addition to workplace deaths, farmworkers experience high
rates of repetitive motion injuries from their backbreaking work
positions. 46 Many, like Juana Lopez, walk with a stoop and still
curse el cortito, the short-handled hoe outlawed in California in
1975 for its infliction of countless occupational injuries. 47 The
grueling manual labor takes an immediate toll on farmworkers'
health and has long-term negative effects, which farmworkers are
unable to afford.48
40. Runyan, supra note 38, at 68 (noting that private household workers and
hired farmworkers are the two lowest-paid occupations in the United States,
significantly lower than similar manual labor occupations).
41. Briefing Rooms: Rural Labor and Education: Farm Labor, ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/LaborAndEducation
/FarmLabor.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2008).
42. KANDEL, supra note 27, at 21. Farmworker wages are significantly lower
than wages of other manual laborers such as construction workers ($520/week),
livestock handlers ($425/week), janitors ($420/week) and groundskeepers
($400/week). Id.
43. Id. at 16-17.
44. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2007, at 3 (Aug. 20, 2008),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/cfoi-08202008.pdf.
45. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Heat-Related Deaths Among Crop
Workers-United States, 1992-2006, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 649,
651 (2008). Even more striking is that the majority of these deaths occurred among
foreign-born adults aged twenty to fifty-four years, a population not at high risk for
heat illnesses. Id.
46. Holley, supra note 18, at 577-78.
47. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
48. Thomas A. Arcury et al., Pesticide Safety Among Farmworkers: Perceived
Risk and Perceived Control as Factors Reflecting Environmental Justice, 110
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 233, 233-39 (2002). Pesticides' adverse health effects range
from the acute, such as headaches, vomiting, respiratory failure, and comas, to the
chronic, including cancer, neurological damage, and reproductive disabilities. Id. at
233.
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C. The Human Impact of Pesticides and Herbicides
In 2000, pesticide expenditures totaled more than $11 billion
in the United States and more than $32.5 billion worldwide.49
One-third of all pesticides are known carcinogens, and they are
ingested by farmworkers orally, dermally, and through
inhalation. 50 In 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimated that nearly twenty thousand farmworkers per
year suffered acute pesticide poisoning.51 Lymphoma and
leukemia have been associated with higher death rates in
midwestern farming regions with high pesticide use. 52 Minority
workers make up a disproportionate percentage of fatalities and
injuries in agriculture.53 Since the days of the Bracero Program,
foreign farmworkers in particular have borne the effects of
pesticides, 54 partly due to the absence of adequate plumbing on-
site for farmworkers like the Lopez family to rinse off these
chemicals.55 The Food Quality Protection Act,56 however, fails to
protect farmworkers in the same way it does consumers.57
49. TIMOTHY KIELY, DAVID DONALDSON & ARTHUR GRUBE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 2000 AND 2001 MARKET
ESTIMATES 4 (2004).
50. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide
Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 431, 434, 441 (2004). In fact, the most popular pesticides,
organophosphates, were developed as chemical weapons for their ability to attack
the nervous system, but both sides in World War II deemed their toxic effects
beyond the pale and neither used them in battle. Gilles Forget, Pesticides:
Necessary but Dangerous Poisons, 18 INT'L DEV. RES. CTR. REP. 4, 5 (1989).
However, scientists noticed that organophosphates affected insects as well as
humans, and after the war they were used as insecticides. Id.
51. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-501T, INFORMATION ON
PESTICIDE ILLNESS REPORTING SYSTEMS 1 (2001). This estimate may be much too
low given that no comprehensive national data are available. Id.
52. Council on Scientific Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Council Report: Cancer Risk
of Pesticides in Agricultural Workers, 260 JAMA 959, 961 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 45, at 651. For
example, from 2003 to 2006 seventy-one percent of occupational heat-related
deaths were attributable to migrant crop workers from Mexico or Central and
South America. Id.
54. In 1959, for example, the California State Division of Industrial Safety
investigated 143 cases of organic phosphate poisoning and reported that "the
typical victim was of Mexican descent, did not speak or read English, and knew
nothing of the hazards to which he was exposed." ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS
OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 196 (1964). The Bracero Program was
established in the 1940s through agreements between the United States and
Mexico which permitted Mexicans to work as temporary migrant laborers in the
United States. See id. at 46-52.
55. KANDEL, supra note 27, at 33.
56. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513.
57. Zachary Wolfe & Roger Rosenthal, Fields of Opportunity: Protecting
Farmworkers Through a Broader Statutory Interpretation, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
[Vol. 29:249256
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Pesticides keep crop costs down for producers and consumers, but
this cost calculation fails to account for the costs to farmworkers,
which are invisible to most consumers.58 The EPA is charged with
ensuring the safety of farmworkers in the fields.59 Its efficacy,
however, is severely diminished because the EPA must consider
the effect of civil penalties on the agricultural employer under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA);6o as
a result, penalties are generally smaller and rarer than similar
penalties under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act). 61
Herbicides forever changed the face of farming in 1946 with
the introduction of 2,4-D. 62 Despite the fact that over two hundred
herbicide-resistant species have evolved worldwide, herbicides are
relied upon by most farmers, who "have found that chemical
herbicides are more cost-effective than migrant laborers."63
Studies of farmers in Kansas, Canada, and Italy have linked
pesticide exposure with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.64 Whether
701, 703 (2000) ("[A]ithough many people are in principle enjoying better protection
against harmful pesticides because of the Food Quality Protection Act, farmworker
exposure on the job remains at high levels, in part because the Act mandates that
the Environmental Protection Agency consider only 'nonoccupational sources."'
(citing 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi) (West 1998)). Such nonoccupational sources
include pesticide use in residential areas and consumer exposure to pesticides
through produce. 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi).
58. Arcury, supra note 48, at 233 (analyzing the disproportionate effects of
pesticides on farmworkers). In fact, the very name "insecticide" is misleading in
that the toxins "are not selective poisons; they do not single out the one species of
which we desire to be rid." RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 99 (1962). Rather, as
Carson contended in the 1962 environmental manifesto Silent Spring, "[tihey
should not be called 'insecticides,' but 'biocides."' Id. at 8.
59. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
60. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(4)
(2006).
61. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970);
Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 451-52 (explaining that the EPA, in
determining sanctions, undertakes a cost-benefit analysis that considers employer
size and the penalty's effect on business); Michael T. Olexa, Pesticide Use and
Impact: FIFRA and Related Regulatory Issues, 68 N.D. L. REV. 445, 448 (1992).
62. Dan Gunderson, Herbicide Resistant Weeds Threaten National Agriculture
(Minnesota Public Radio broadcast Aug. 21, 2000), available at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200008/21_gundersond-weeds-m/.
The first synthetic herbicide, 2,4-D, is widely believed to be responsible for the
significant annual increases in crop production during the 1950s. David C.
Bridges, Benefits of Triazine Herbicides in Corn and Sorghum Production, in THE
TRIAZINE HERBICIDES: 50 YEARS REVOLUTIONIZING AGRICULTURE 163, 163 (Homer
M. LeBaron et al. eds., 2008).
63. Gunderson, supra note 62.
64. Irva Hertz-Picciotto, How Scientists View Causality and Assess Evidence: A
Study of the Institute of Medicine's Evaluation of Health Effects in Vietnam
Veterans and Agent Orange, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 553, 580-82 (2005).
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acute or chronic, pesticides' negative effects on farmworkers
contribute to making agriculture one of the most dangerous
industries. 65 As a result of acute and chronic pesticide illness, as
well as workplace injuries, the life expectancy of migrant
farmworkers is forty-nine years, while the national average is
seventy-five years.66
III. The Inadequacy of Current Statutory Protections
The current patchwork of laws and regulations covering most
American workers offers only minimal protections to farmworkers,
and in particular to migrant workers and international
immigrants. Multiple exemptions, lack of inspection mechanisms,
and lax enforcement of these federal and state laws fail to
safeguard farm hands and result in dangerous working conditions
for hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers.6 7
A. Fair Labor Standards Act and Its Blind Spot for
Farmworkers
The exemption of farmworkers from the protections of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)68 evidences U.S. agricultural
protectionism.69 FLSA generally requires payment of minimum
wages, standard record keeping, and compliance with child labor
regulations. 70 Despite the dangerous working conditions on farms,
FLSA expressly exempts child farmworkers from numerous
protective provisions.7 1  For example, children younger than
twelve can work on their parents' farm, children twelve to thirteen
years old can work with parental consent, and children aged
fourteen and older can work without consent. 72 Agricultural
workers employed either on small farms or for seasonal work are
exempted from both minimum wage and overtime pay. 73 The
65. OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 2.
66. Sonia Sandhaus, Migrant Health: A Harvest of Poverty, 98 AM. J. NURSING
52, 52 (1998).
67. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 457-59.
68. Fair Labor Standards Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(c) (2006).
69. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. See also Cunningham-Parmeter,
supra note 50, at 463-64 (explaining that a large agricultural lobby at FLSA's
inception prevented the protections of the FLSA from applying to most
farmworkers).
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 211(c), 212.
71. Id. § 213(c)(1)(A)-(C).
72. Thus, for example, children younger than twelve can have free range to
work around a farm's dangerous equipment. See id.
73. Id. § 213(a)(6)(A) ("The provisions ... shall not apply with respect to ...
any employee employed in agriculture if such employee is employed by an employer
258 [Vol. 29:249
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exemption also abrogates perhaps the most important portion of
FLSA: the anti-retaliation provision, which allows workers to
safely exercise their rights granted by other provisions of FLSA. 74
B. OSH Act,75 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA),76 and FIFRA : Good Intentions that Fail to
Protect Farmworkers
OSH Act, FIFRA, and FFDCA all contain provisions
pertinent to farmworkers, but their procedural guarantees fall
short in actual practice. The FFDCA largely regulates pesticide
residue on foods, protecting consumers, not farmworkers, 78 while
FIFRA establishes a regulatory system for all pesticides to be
approved by the EPA.79 In 1996, the EPA issued the Worker
Protection Standard (WPS), a regulation requiring "workplace
practices designed to reduce or eliminate exposure to pesticides
. .. ."s0 The WPS mandated posting pesticide safety information,8'
field re-entry restrictions, 82 and notice to workers of pesticide
applications.83 The WPS, however, is difficult to implement, and
the EPA's enforcement of this standard through state cooperation
is largely limited to seminal events, applied retroactively rather
than preventatively. 84
The OSH Act and its implementing regulations also have
who did not, during any calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use
more than five hundred man-days of agricultural labor."). It is unlikely that
employers using a large crew for one or two weeks would reach the five hundred
man-days threshold required under the FLSA. David M. Saxowsky et al.,
Employing Migrant Agricultural Workers: Overcoming the Challenge of Complying
with Employment Laws, 69 N.D. L. REV. 307, 316 (1993).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) ("[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this chapter . . . .").
75. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2006).
76. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-94 (2006).
77. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(2006).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 346.
79. 7 U.S.C. § 136w.
80. 40 C.F.R. § 170.1 (2009).
81. Id. § 170.135(a).
82. Id. § 170.112(a).
83. Id. § 170.120(b).
84. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOJRCED-00-40, PESTICIDES:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN 20-25 (2000) ("[Wlithout a valid means of monitoring acute pesticide
illnesses, there is no way to determine whether risk assessment and management
practices are effective in preventing hazardous exposure incidents.").
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numerous substantive provisions which could potentially impact
field conditions but which still fall short.85 Under the OSH Act,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has
clear enforcement standards, powerful management systems,
"right-to-know" protections, inspections and monitoring
procedures, and significant penalties.86 The OSH Act ultimately
fails to adequately protect farmworkers, however, because it
grants no private right of action87 and is under-enforced by
OSHA.88
C. Other Legislation that Lacks Farmworker Protection
Additionally, farmworkers remain excluded from most
general employment statutes. Agricultural labor has long been
exempted from the Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1954,89
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,90 and state unemployment
85. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (requiring employers to provide a worksite
"free from recognized hazards"); id. § 657 (authorizing inspection of worksites);
OSHA Field Sanitation Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1928.110 (1987) (requiring
agricultural employers to provide hand-washing facilities, toilets, and potable
water of certain minimum quality where eleven or more farmworkers are engaged
in manual labor).
86. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 657, (2006).
87. Id. §653(b)(4) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed ... to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner [a worker's] common law or statutory rights
. . . ."); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Rumsfeld, 321 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("[I]t is now well established that 'OSHA violations do not themselves
constitute a private cause of action for breach."') (internal citation omitted); see
Laura Lockard, Toward Safer Fields: Using AWPA's Working Arrangement
Provisions to Enforce Health and Safety Regulations Designed to Protect
Farmworkers, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 507, 513 (2003).
88. Id. at 514 (noting that farmworker rights are rarely enforced since OSH Act
targets inspections at "imminent danger or . . . immediate fatalities" and
agriculture fits neither of these categories). OSHA, for instance, conducted just
over 39,000 worksite inspections in all industries in 2007, despite the fact that
there were 7.1 million worksites in 2004. Fritz Ebinger, Exposed to the Elements:
Workers' Compensation and Unauthorized Farm Workers in the Midwest, 13 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 263, 276 (2008); OSHA Enforcement: Striving for Safe and Healthy
Workplaces, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/dep/enforcement/enforcementresults_07.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010). Agriculture is not deemed a priority for OSHA; therefore,
agricultural inspections happen even more infrequently than in other occupations.
Id. Overall, however, there are more than 2.2 million farms which would account
for nearly thirty percent of the nation's total worksites if all farms were deemed
worksites by OSHA. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AC-07-
A-51, 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 66 (2009).
89. Federal Insurance Contributions Act §3121, 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). The
Act exempts foreign temporary guest workers and most farmworkers. Id. §
3121(b)(1), (g).
90. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (2006). An agricultural
employer is not subject to this Act if the employer paid less than $20,000 quarterly
in wages for agricultural labor or did not employ ten or more individuals for more
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insurance acts.91 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)92
expressly excludes "any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer" from its union protection provisions.9 3 The exemption of
farmworkers from these unemployment statutes makes them
extremely vulnerable to employers' threats of termination, and
their exclusion from the NLRA means that they lack the power to
advocate for themselves through union organizing.9 4
D. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act 95: A Beginning, Not an End, for
Farmworker Justice
Due to this exclusion of farmworkers from almost every other
employment statute, MSAWPA was crafted to "assure necessary
protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers . . . ."96
Its predecessor, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of
1963 (FLCRA),97 was the first federal labor statute to expressly
regulate the agricultural employment relationship,9 8 forcing farm
labor contractors to comply with health and safety regulations and
attempting to offset the numerous inequalities between employer
and employee.9 9 In 1974, FLCRA was amended to include harsher
than twenty days, with each day falling during a different calendar week during
that or the preceding calendar year. Id. § 3306(a)(2).
91. E.g., In re Wenatchbee Beebe Orchard Co., 133 P.2d 283, 285 (Wash. 1943)
(holding that fruit packing was agricultural labor and therefore exempt from
Washington state unemployment law). In Minnesota, employers are exempt from
providing health care insurance if they hire fewer than five migrant labor
farmworkers or if an employee performs "exclusively agricultural labor.
MINN. STAT. § 181.73 (2004).
92. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
93. Id. § 152(3). Despite C6sar Chavez's successful efforts with the United
Farm Workers to unionize migrant farmworkers in California in the 1970s, CtkSAR
CHAVEZ: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY WITH DOCUMENTS 15 (Richard W. Etulain ed., 2002),
few farmworkers today can or do unionize due to the exclusion of farmworkers from
the NLRA. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 12, at 248.
94. See OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 39.
95. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (2006)).
96. Id. § 1801.
97. Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78
Stat. 920 (1964) (repealed 1983).
98. See Marion Quisenbery, A Labor Law for Agriculture: The Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Workers' Protection Act, 30 S.D. L. REV. 311, 311-12 (1985).
99. Mark J. Russo, The Tension Between the Need and Exploitation of Migrant
Workers: Using MSAWPA's Legislative Intent to Find a Balanced Remedy, 7 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 195, 203 (2001) (explaining that the purpose of FLCRA was to offset
the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees and to require
full disclosure regarding key aspects of employment, such as housing).
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penalties and to strengthen enforcement measures,100 as well as to
stipulate that employment information must be conveyed in a
language understood by the farmworker.11 Ultimately, however,
FLCRA "failed to reverse the historical pattern of abuse and
exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers,"102 largely
because it only regulated the farm labor contractor 0 3 and because
its protections had seven large exemptions.104
MSAWPA was enacted in 1983105 to remedy these weak
protections of FLCRA.106 MSAWPA regulates agricultural
employers in addition to labor contractors.107 Among its
substantive protections for migrant agricultural workers are
requirements of full disclosure of working conditions in the
recruitment process, 0 8 conspicuous posting of workers' rights
under MSAWPA,109 and notices posted in whatever languages are
common to the workers." 0 Agricultural employers are prohibited
from violating "the terms of any working arrangement,""' which
could include wages, supplies, tools, or other work-related
100. See Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-518, sec. 13, § 9, 88 Stat. 1652, 1656-57 (repealed 1983).
101. See id. sec. 10, § 6(b), at 1655. MSAWPA contains a similar requirement.
29 U.S.C. § 1831(f) (2006) ("Such information shall be provided in English or, as
necessary and reasonable, in Spanish or other language common to seasonal
agricultural workers who are not fluent or literate in English.").
102. H.R. REP. No. 97-885, at 3 (1982).
103. Lockard, supra note 87, at 522. The farm labor contractors were
subcontractors who did the hiring and transporting of migrant farmworkers and
therefore distanced the agricultural employers from liability. See id.
104. See Russo, supra note 99, at 203. Among the exemptions were those for
nonprofit organizations, farmers supplying workers solely for their own farm, any
person engaging in activity solely within a twenty-five-mile radius for no more than
thirteen weeks per year, and any person employing legal foreign guest workers.
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, sec. 2, § 3, at 1652-
53.
105. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (2006)).
106. Lockard, supra note 87, at 522.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a); Sunil Bhave, Opening the Courtroom Doors for Migrant
Workers: The Need for a Nationwide Service of Process Amendment to the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 47 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 899, 906
(2003).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (requiring recruiters to disclose wage rates, crops to be
farmed, transportation, housing, costs to be charged, and commissions).
109. Id. § 1821(b) ("Each . . . agricultural employer . . . shall, at the place of
employment, post in a conspicuous place a poster . .. setting forth the rights and
protections afforded such workers under this chapter. . . .").
110. Id. § 1821(g) (requiring notices and forms to be posted in the employees'
language of literacy).
111. Id. § 1822(c).
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112 MSAWPA also stipulates motor vehicle safety
requirements for migrant worker transportation. 113
Despite Congress's intention to better address the problems
faced by agricultural workers, MSAWPA contains a number of
holes that prevent the Act from attaining that goal. First,
MSAWPA does not expressly cover health regulations under its
"working arrangements" provision, 114 although its legislative
history suggests that Congress considered the health risks to be
serious.115 Second, MSAWPA leaves large exemptions for family
farms and small farms. 116 Additionally, MSAWPA provides for
enforcement through both criminal and administrative action, but
fails to provide for adequate inspections of agricultural
employers.11 7  Finally, though MSAWPA-unlike other
farmworker protections-creates a private right of action for
enforcement of its provisions,1 18 this mechanism is only useful if
agricultural employees can successfully bring a claim to court. 119
IV. Macro and Micro Solutions to MSAWPA's Flawed
Farmworker Protections
In order to more fully safeguard domestic migrant farm-
workers, the current legislative patchwork must be further
developed. Though MSAWPA is federal legislation, both state and
international law may serve as models for providing farmworkers
access to justice.
112. See id. § 1822(a)-(b).
113. Id. § 1841.
114. Id. § 1832(c) ("No farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, or
agricultural association shall, without justification, violate the terms of any
working arrangement made by that contractor, employer, or association with any
seasonal agricultural worker.").
115. H.R. REP. No. 97-885, at 2 (1982) (stating that Congress considered migrant
and seasonal farmworkers the "most abused of all workers in the United States").
In debating MSAWPA, Congress cited numerous instances of farmworker abuse,
including a tragic accident in which forty-seven teenage farmworkers were involved
in a serious car crash while being transported in the back of a truck. Id. at 3.
116. See infra notes 200-208 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 178-192 and accompanying text. MSAWPA provides that
the Secretary of Labor "shall, as may be appropriate, investigate, and ... enter and
inspect such places ... and such records . .. [and] question such persons and gather
such information to determine compliance with this chapter .... ".29 U.S.C.
§ 1862(a).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1854.
119. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; see also Bhave, supra note 107,
at 910-11 (explaining the difficulties migrant farmworkers face in exercising
personal jurisdiction over agricultural employers).
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A. State Statutes
Given the inadequacies of federal legislation in protecting
farmworkers, some states have crafted their own statutes to
safeguard farmworkers laboring in one of this nation's most
dangerous occupations. 120 Florida regulations require agricultural
employers with five to ten workers to meet the same field
sanitation standard expected of employers with more than ten
employees under OSHA requirements, ensuring that all but the
very smallest Florida farmers adhere to minimum safety
standards. 121 Additionally, Florida grants government officials as
well as health and legal services providers largely unrestricted
access to migrant housing,122 thereby enabling more effective
monitoring of contractor and employer compliance with these
safety standards.
California has a long-standing legacy of guaranteeing
stronger protections for farmworkers, largely as a result of
legendary advocate C6sar Chivez.123 Nearly one hundred years
after the California Land Settlement Actl 24 significantly curtailed
the land rights of Mexicans and Mexican Americans,125 Chavez
succeeded in organizing farmworkers and ridding the fields of
short-handled hoes, 126 causing California to take ergonomics into
account in evaluating work injuries for farmworkers.127 Chdvez
120. OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 2-3 (critiquing federal and most state laws as
providing inadequate protections for farmworkers).
121. Compare FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-14.016 (2007) (requiring any
location in which five to ten farmworkers are employed to provide one toilet facility,
one hand washing unit, and cool, potable drinking water served in single-serve
cups) with OSHA Field Sanitation Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1928.110 (1987) (requiring
any agricultural establishment in which more than ten employees are working to
provide one toilet and hand-washing facility for every twenty employees and cool,
potable drinking water served in single-use cups).
122. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.008(6), 381.0088, 381.00897(2) (West 2007).
123. See OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 44.
124. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631.
125. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties,
and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 220-21 (1996)
(discussing the California Land Settlement Act of 1851 which required individuals
of Spanish or Mexican origin who had land rights to show affirmative proof of their
legal land ownership). The California Land Settlement Act was one of the various
laws used by the United States to divest property from those already living in the
New World. Id.
126. Douglas L. Murray, The Abolition of El Cortito, the Short-Handled Hoe: A
Case Study in Social Conflict and State Policy in California Agriculture, 30 Soc.
PROBS. 26, 31-32 (1982) (depicting the seven-year struggle to outlaw short-handled
hoes in the fields of California). Short-handled hoes, or cortitos, were literally
backbreaking harvesting implements, which came to signify farmworkers'
oppression. Id. at 29-30.
127. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5110 (2000) (requiring employers to institute
264 [Vol. 29:249
"JOBS AMERICANS WON'T DO"
also advocated for union representation in the fields, 128 something
that had been denied farmworkers since the passage of the
NLRA. 129 The outcome of this advocacy was California's
Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975,130 which assured
California farmworkers the right to organize and bargain
collectively. 131 While less than ten percent of California
farmworkers were unionized in 2004,132 even fewer are able to do
so under federal law. 133 California agricultural legislation also
assures farmworkers a state minimum wage1 34 and unemployment
compensation. 135 Unlike the FLSA, which exempts farmworkers
from overtime pay, 136 California law ensures standard overtime
pay of one-and-a-half times that of regular pay. 13 7 Like Florida,11 8
California laws require OSHA-style field sanitation standards. 139
California, however, applies these standards to all employers, even
if they only hire a single farmworker. 140 Farm labor contractors
are required to register with the Labor Commissioner and meet
certain safety minimums for the transportation of migrants. 141
California's most important contribution to the national
dialogue on farmworker protections is its pesticide legislation.
While the EPA lacks strong enforcement or monitoring
mechanisms for agricultural employers,142 California-the largest
agricultural state-has chartered several laws which aim to
measures to reduce repetitive motion injuries and mandatory training for
employees).
128. OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 44.
129. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69).
130. Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152, 1975 Cal.
Stats. 3rd Ex. Sess. 4013 (West 2009) ("Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
131. Id.; see CESAR CHAVEZ: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY WITH DOCUMENTS, supra note
93, at 16.
132. See OXFAM AM., supra note 21, at 44.
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding agricultural laborers from union
protection provisions).
134. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11000 (2010) (guaranteeing wages of at least $6.75
per hour for all workers, including agricultural laborers).
135. Id. tit. 22, §§ 1251-1-1265.6-1.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2006).
137. CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2003).
138. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
139. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6712.
140. Id.
141. Id. §§ 1695(a)(9), 1696.4.
142. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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establish a high threshold and create accountability in the
pesticide arena.14 3  First, California requires trainings from
industry-qualified instructors for those working with pesticides. 144
Second, pesticides must be registered and periodically reregis-
tered.145 Third, a person who orders a farmworker into a field in
violation of reentry requirements is guilty of a misdemeanor
offense for each affected worker.146  Additionally, California
provides for mandatory, employer-provided medical exams for
employees working with carcinogens.147 The fines for failure to
report carcinogen use are substantial, ranging from a minimum of
$500 to a $10,000 penalty for repeated serious violations.148
B. International Models of Farmworker Protections
International law also serves as a model for improving the
plight of farmworkers in the United States. In a globalized world,
variances in farmworker protections have international
implications and a survey of current international farmworker
conventions and recommendations can help establish an
acceptable baseline for American domestic law.
1. International Labour Organization
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was founded in
1919 and adopted as the United Nations' first specialized agency
in 1946.149 The ILO recently adopted the Convention Concerning
Safety and Health in Agriculture (ILO Safety Convention),
although the United States has yet to ratify it. 150 This important
international agreement stipulates that farmworkers must be
143. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12980 (West 2001) ("The Legislature hereby
finds and declares that it is necessary and desirable to provide for the safe use of
pesticides and for safe working conditions for farmworkers . . .
144. Id. § 12986(a)-(b).
145. See id. § 12988.
146. Id. § 12985.
147. CAL. LAB. CODE § 9040 (West 2003).
148. Id. § 9060. The Code establishes a $2000 minimum fine for serious
violations and a $5000 fine for repeated violations. Id.
149. About the ILO, INT'L LAB. ORG. [ILO], http://www.ilo.org/globallabout-the_
ILO/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
150. Convention Concerning Safety and Health in Agriculture, June 21, 2001,
ILO-C184, 2227 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter ILO Safety Convention]. This
convention has been ratified by thirteen countries, including Argentina, Finland,
Luxembourg, Slovakia, Sweden, and Uruguay. ILOLEX Database of International
Labour Standards: Convention No. C184, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
convdispl.htm (follow "C184" hyperlink; then follow "See the ratifications for this
Convention" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
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informed of the effect of new technology on their health,15 1 and
that agricultural employers must ensure that training accounts for
the education and language abilities of the farmworkers.152 The
ILO Safety Convention also provides that workers have the right
to remove themselves from work dangers with no resulting
disadvantage.153
The ILO has issued other conventions which could also
impact the situation of farmworkers in the United States. In
1990, the ILO issued a convention regarding workplace
chemicals 154 stating that "the protection of workers from the
harmful effects of chemicals also enhances the protection of the
general public and the environment . . . ."155 Much like California
law,156 the Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals
at Work (ILO Chemical Convention) states that employers should
not only prevent exposures, but also assess, monitor, and record
exposures, and be liable to a competent authority for their
employees' health and safety.15 7  Similarly, the ILO Convention
Concerning Labour Inspection in Agriculture (ILO Labour
Inspection Convention), signed in 1969, provides that agricultural
labor inspections should monitor wages, workplace safety, and
health, as well as the employment of women and children.15 8
151. ILO Safety Convention, supra note 150, at 246 ("Workers in agriculture
shall have the right . .. to be informed and consulted on safety and health matters
including risks from new technologies .... .").
152. Id. at 245-46 ("[T]he employer shall . . . ensure that adequate and
appropriate training and comprehensible instructions ... are provided to workers
in agriculture . . . taking into account their level of education and differences in
language . . . .").
153. Id. at 246 ("Workers in agriculture shall have the right . . . to remove
themselves from danger . . . when they have reasonable justification to believe
there is an imminent and serious risk to their safety and health . . . . They shall
not be placed at any disadvantage as a result of these actions.").
154. 73 ILO, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, in
OFFICIAL BULLETIN: SERIES A 71 (1992) [hereinafter ILO Chemical Convention].
This convention has been ratified by seventeen countries, including Brazil, China,
Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, and Zimbabwe, though not the United
States. ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards: Convention No.
C1 70, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (follow "C170"
hyperlink; then follow "See the ratifications for this Convention" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 9, 2010).
155. ILO Chemical Convention, supra note 154, at 71. The ILO's concern with
farmworker safety contrasts with the concerns of the EPA, which almost
exclusively monitors the effects of pesticide exposure on consumers, without
assessing their effects on farmworkers. See Wolfe & Rosenthal, supra note 57, at
703.
156. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12980 (West 2001).
157. ILO Chemical Convention, supra note 154, at 75-76.
158. Convention Concerning Labour Inspection in Agriculture, June 25, 1969,
ILO C129, 812 U.N.T.S. 88 [hereinafter ILO Labour Inspection Convention]. This
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The ILO Safety Convention, the ILO Labour Inspection
Convention, and the ILO Chemical Convention all establish
important international norms that could serve as models for
revising MSAWPA to more effectively protect agricultural workers
within the United States.
2. National Labor Courts
Although employment sectors in the United States are
governed by numerous federal laws, state laws, and
administrative agencies, most of the world uses labor courts to
settle labor disputes and adjudicate employment claims. 159 While
many labor courts could serve as models for an agricultural worker
agency, the Swedish and Israeli labor courts are uniquely suited to
the United States' situation.
The Swedish Labor Court (Arbetsdomstolen) is a tripartite
court that rules on all employment-related matters.160 The court
consists of three chairmen, three vice-chairmen, and sixteen lay
members. 161 All members of the court are government-
appointed.162 The chairmen and vice-chairmen must be neutral
and be lawyers with judicial experience, and at least two of the lay
members must be neutral and possess specialized employment
knowledge.163 The remaining lay members are selected from a
group of individuals nominated by unions, employers, and
government authorities. 6 4 The unique makeup of the Swedish
Labor Court makes it both a respected, neutral arbiter of
employment disputes and an administrative body imbued with
first-hand knowledge of the employment sector.165 Its decisions,
therefore, appear, and in fact are, more just for both parties
involved, resulting in greater compliance with and respect for the
convention has been ratified by forty-nine countries, including Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and Ukraine. ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards:
Convention No. C129, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/englishI/convdispl.htm (follow
"C129" hyperlink; then follow "See the ratifications for this Convention" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010). The United States is conspicuously absent from this
"who's who" of the developed world.
159. See Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A
Selective Comparison, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 35, 36 (1985) (comparing the







165. Id. at 37.
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labor court.16 6
The Israeli National Labor Court is also a tripartite judicial
body, which has succeeded in effectively managing all of Israel's
employment issues without ignoring large sectors of the
workforce.167  The court "considers all employees-whether
residents or migrant, whether with or without permits-as fully
covered by labor and employment laws."168 While the government
and legislature have proved largely ineffective in protecting
migrant and immigrant workers, 69 the Israeli National Labor
Court has prohibited employers from holding workers' passports170
and has relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules to facilitate
legitimate migrant worker lawsuits.171 The court's willingness to
adjudicate all employment claims, regardless of the industry and
the individual's residence status, has greatly aided in protecting
all of Israel's workers.
V. Mending the Hodgepodge of Farmworker Legislation by
Revising MSAWPA
The current smattering of statutes has failed to properly
protect farmworkers in U.S. fields, resulting in depressed wages,
deadly work environments, and oppressive labor conditions for a
uniquely vulnerable community.172 While numerous regulations
and statutes could be amended to better safeguard farmworkers'
rights, MSAWPA is best suited to protect farmworkers because of
both its breadth of coverage and its specific focus on agricultural
laborers.173 In reforming MSAWPA, Congress could simulta-
neously remedy the inequalities farmworkers face in FLSA, OSH
Act, FIFRA, FFDCA, and other federal and state laws.174
Much as MSAWPA improved upon FLCRA in 1983,175
166. See id.
167. See Guy Davidov, Enforcement Problems in "Informal" Labor Markets: A
View from Israel, 27 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 3, 20 (2005) (explaining that the
National Labor Court's jurisdiction over "all employees" has made it more effective
than the other branches of government in ensuring justice for migrant workers).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 13-21.
170. Id. at 20 (citing Labor Appeal 1459/02 Buchiman v. Best Entrepreneurship
and Const. Ltd., 38 P.D.A. 824 (2003) (Isr.)).
171. Id. (citing Labor Appeal 1127/00 Orsatz v. Denya Sibus Ltd., 37 P.D.A. 305
(2002) (Isr.) (finding that even when a migrant worker leaves the country before his
or her scheduled cross-examination, the case will proceed)).
172. See discussion supra Part II.
173. See discussion supra Part III.D.
174. See discussion supra Parts III.A-C.
175. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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legislative reform of MSAWPA would make farm work more
appealing to domestic workers and largely eliminate the low-paid,
vulnerable sub-class which is now composed predominantly of
undocumented immigrants or "working poor" domestic migrant
families. 7 6 In order to right the injustice in our nation's fields,
this legislative remedy must address MSAWPA's lack of
enforcement, inspections, and adjudications; its excessive
exemptions; and its failure to regulate working conditions.177
A. MSAWPA's Enforcement and Inspection Mechanisms
MSAWPA should be reformed to make its enforcement and
inspection provisions significant enough to deter violations of its
mandates and to create an administrative body to preside over all
employment claims arising out of farm work. Currently, under
MSAWPA's enforcement mechanism, a willful and knowing
violation can result in a $1000 maximum fine, a one-year prison
sentence, or both; subsequent violations increase the penalty to a
$10,000 maximum fine, a three-year prison term, or both.178 The
Secretary of Labor may petition sua sponte for injunctive relief,'7 9
and MSAWPA allows individuals to pursue private rights of
action.18 0  The Secretary of Labor is solely responsible for
investigating work environments, housing, and vehicles.181
MSAWPA's enforcement mechanisms, however, make it
difficult for many farmworkers to be adequately compensated for
their injuries in the field. Repeated violations of a single provision
of the Act count as only one violation in computing statutory
damages, which are capped at the amount of actual damages or
$500 per plaintiff per violation.182 Additionally, certified class
actions are capped at the lesser of $500 per plaintiff per violation
or $500,000 in total.183 Further frustrating these important class
action claims, federally funded legal services providers serving
indigent clients have since been prohibited by federal legislation
176. See ROTHENBERG, supra note 12 (explaining the circumstances that keep
migrant farmworkers in the fields as working poor).
177. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2006).
179. Id. § 1852(a) ("The Secretary may petition any appropriate district court ...
for temporary or permanent injunctive relief if the Secretary determines that this
chapter ... has been violated.").
180. Id. § 1854(a) ("Any person aggrieved ... may file suit in any district court of
the United States . . . without regard to the citizenship of the parties and without
regard to exhaustion of any alternative administrative remedies . . .
181. Id. § 1862(a).
182. Id. § 1854(c).
183. Id.
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from participating in class action lawsuits 184 like those mentioned
in MSAWPA. Since many migrant farmworkers live below the
poverty line 85 and can only afford pro bono representation, the
barriers to free or reduced-fee legal services seriously weaken the
utility of MSAWPA.
Class action lawsuits and serious penalties for offenders are
vital for effectively safeguarding migrant farmworkers under
MSAWPA.186 Meaningful legislative reform of MSAWPA should
raise the $500 cap on private individual remedies in order to
adequately compensate wronged employees, enable class action
lawsuits to be brought by federally funded legal services providers,
and allow each violation to stand as a separate count rather than
in the aggregate.187 These changes would add much-needed teeth
to MSAWPA by better enforcing its current provisions and by
increasing its available remedies for farmworkers.
Similarly, MSAWPA lacks meaningful inspection require-
ments that would hold agricultural employers accountable and
ensure safe working conditions and fair labor terms for migrant
farmworkers.188 The current inspection systems of the EPA,
OSHA, and MSAWPA are negligible,189 so adding periodic agri-
cultural inspections to MSAWPA, like those described by the
ILO,o9 0 would enable the Secretary of Labor to effectively monitor
employers' compliance with MSAWPA's wage and health safe-
guards. Additionally, MSAWPA should allow government officials,
as well as legal and health services providers, access to migrant
farmworker camps without invitation in order to create an extra
184. Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1353 (prohibiting federal legal service
funds from being used to "initiate[] or participate[| in a class action suit").
Additionally, this legislation banned funds to represent undocumented immigrants.
Id. § 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. at 1354-55. See also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: How CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A
LAWYER 2-22 (2000) (comparing the effectiveness of legal services providers before
and after this legislation).
185. KANDEL, supra note 27, at 27 (illustrating that over twenty-five percent of
noncitizen farmworkers live below poverty level and less than ten percent of
migrant farmworkers have health insurance).
186. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 184, at 18 (detailing how
current restrictions on legal services provided to migrant farmworkers have
hindered adequate representation and resulted in the abandoning of many
potential lawsuits).
187. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2006) (granting only the Secretary of Labor
authority to investigate and determine compliance with the Act).
189. See discussion supra Part III.
190. ILO Labour Inspection Convention, supra note 158, 812 U.N.T.S. at 92.
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level of accountability for agricultural employers.191 Adding these
dual inspection elements to MSAWPA would encourage employer
compliance, establish workplace accountability, and augment
enforcement of the existing MSAWPA provisions.192
Since both migrant and immigrant agricultural workers are
expressly excluded from our nation's statutory protections, they
cannot use the adjudication procedures of existing administrative
bodies. Any statutory changes in MSAWPA, therefore, must also
be accompanied by the creation of an administrative body
equipped to adjudicate all claims falling outside of the purview of
current laws. This administrative body's jurisdiction would be
defined not by the type of claim (wage, freedom of association, safe
working environment) but rather by the type of claimant-
farmworkers would be precluded from seeking other forms of
relief. Such an administrative body, the "Agricultural Worker
Protection Agency" (AWPA), would be modeled on the labor courts
of Israel and Sweden, which are equipped to adjudicate every
aspect of labor and employment law.193 AWPA would be
empowered to adjudicate claims arising under the revised
MSAWPA, providing administrative oversight of agricultural
employers and remedial recourse for aggrieved workers.194
The structure of AWPA would also result in fairer
employment conditions for agricultural workers because it would
balance the interests of employer and employee. Like the Swedish
Labor Court, AWPA should be a tripartite court, with government-
appointed judges serving as neutral arbiters and partisan lay
members representing both employer and employee interests.
These lay members could be voted into office by their constituents
(unions and employer groups), or, following Sweden's example,
they could be appointed by the government from nomination lists
submitted by these respective groups. Not only would such a
tripartite system give a greater voice to agricultural workers, it
would also provide a venue for compromise and cooperation
between agricultural employers and farmworkers. Without the
formation of AWPA, the rest of the statutory reforms to MSAWPA
will be little more than a "paper victory" for farmworker rights.
191. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 182-191 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
194. Where appropriate, the substantive standards already established in the
OSH Act and NLRA could be incorporated into AWPA's mandate. See supra notes
85 and 92 and accompanying text.
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B. MSAWPA Exemptions
MSAWPA's exemptions are numerous and severely limit its
effectiveness in regulating the sphere of farming. 195 These exemp-
tions strike at the very heart of the statute, nullifying its
protections for hundreds of thousands of farmworkers, and can
only be explained by the large agricultural lobby present at
MSAWPA's inception.196 The most limiting exceptions to this
statute include the labor organization exception,197 as well as the
two most invoked'9 8: the small farmer 99 and the family business
exceptions. 200
Exempting small farms from MSAWPA's sweeping
safeguards has the effect of withholding protection from the most
isolated agricultural laborers. The small farm exemption was
initially justified by the fragility of such farms 201 and the
persistent public nostalgia for a pastoral view of farming. 202
However, small farms still comprise a majority of all agricultural
operations in the United StateS203 and therefore constitute a
significant loophole in the protections of MSAWPA, permitting at
least sixty percent of agricultural employers to escape MSAWPA's
provisions for hired farmworkers. 204 The burgeoning growth of
195. See Russo, supra note 99, at 206.
196. Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 521, 532 (2002) (explaining that the sugar industry lobbied hard for
the exemptions for temporary foreign agricultural workers under MSAWPA). The
agricultural lobby was also instrumental in weakening the protections afforded by
FIFRA, OSH Act, and the WPS. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 50, at 466-70.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(3) (2006) (exempting labor organizations from the Act's
protections).
198. Russo, supra note 99, at 219.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2) (exempting small businesses employing fewer than
five hundred "man-days" of agricultural labor).
200. Id. § 1803(a)(1) (exempting individuals engaged in farm labor contracting
activities on behalf of agricultural operations owned and operated by family
members).
201. Beth Lyon, Farm Workers in Illinois: Law Reforms and Opportunities for
the Legal Academy to Assist Some of the State's Most Disadvantaged Workers, 29 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 263, 270 (2005).
202. See Sally Schauman, The Garden and the Red Barn: The Pervasive Pastoral
and Its Environmental Consequences, 56 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 181, 183-
84 (1998).
203. Small farms can be defined in numerous ways. The U.S. Department of
Agriculture has indicated that farms with sales of less than $250,000 comprise 90
percent of all farms. KANDEL, supra note 27, at 3. Those with sales of less than
$10,000 account for 60 percent of the market. NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV.,
supra note 88, at 7 tbl.1.
204. Id. While not a perfect estimate, small farms making less than $10,000
annually probably require fewer than five hundred man-days of labor, which would
2732011]
Law and Inequality
organic farms, most of which are small-scale agricultural
operations, suggests that small farming will remain viable while
continuing to be exempted from MSAWPA's regulations.205
Similar to California's farmworker laws, 206 restructuring
MSAWPA so that it applies to all farms, no matter the size, would
better protect farmworkers and enhance employers' accountability.
Likewise, the family business exemption also dramatically
limits the application of MSAWPA. While the family exemption
may have made sense when farmers only staffed their agricultural
operations with family members or local hired hands, the modern
phenomenon of staffing family farms with migrant farmworkerS207
refutes such an outdated rationale. While these farms may be
hesitant to subject family members or local acquaintances to
dismal wages or dangerous work environments, this often does not
hold true for their treatment of migrant farmworkers. 208 Instead,
Congress should amend MSAWPA to excise the family business
exemption and establish legal obligations for farmers that reflect
this transition from family farming to hired migrant farmworker
agriculture.
Moreover, MSAWPA's exemption for labor organizations
cripples the advocacy of farmworker organizers like Csar Chivez
and discourages farmworkers from advocating for their own needs.
Although farmworkers are expressly excluded from freedom of
association protections under the NLRA,209 even workers
informally organized or unionized under a state labor statute210
exempt nearly two-thirds of all farms from MSAWPA's provisions. See supra note
199 and accompanying text.
205. Certified organic crop acreage in the United States doubled from 1997 to
2005, and most of these farms are smaller than conventional operations.
CATHERINE GREENE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EMERGING ISSUES IN THE U.S.
ORGANIC INDUSTRY 4 (2009). Since many of these organic farms are exempted from
most farmworker protections, their certified organic produce may be healthier for
consumers, but decidedly not "fair trade." See Patricia Medige, The Labyrinth:
Pursuing a Human Trafficking Case in Middle America, 10 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 269, 276 (2007) (discussing the human trafficking and torture that occurred
at a Colorado organic farm that claimed it was a "responsible steward of planet
Earth").
206. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
207. See Holley, supra note 18, at 577-94 (explaining that farmers' practice of
using migrant farmworkers to satisfy a high demand for labor is common); see also
KANDEL, supra note 27, at 4 (noting that the average number of family
farmworkers per farm declined significantly from 1950 to 2006, while the average
number of hired farmworkers and seasonal workers per farm increased).
208. See Holley, supra note 18, at 577-94.
209. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
210. E.g., Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West
2003).
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find themselves without any statutory rights under MSAWPA. 211
Much of the world already allows migrant farmworkers to
unionize,212 and removing this exemption from MSAWPA would
allow more states to follow California's lead and give a voice to this
community.213  If MSAWPA enabled labor organizing, then
migrant farmworkers would likely have substantial bargaining
power to advocate for their own interests, and the enforcement of
MSAWPA's provisions might be monitored and compelled by
agricultural unions.
C. MSAWPA's Neglect of Working Arrangements
Although the legislative history of MSAWPA suggests that
Congress wanted to protect the "most abused of all workers in the
United States,"214 it is unclear whether Congress intended its
prohibition against "violat[ing] the terms of any working arrange-
ment"215 to include health and workplace safety violations. The
only mandated safety provisions in MSAWPA deal with the
transportation of farmworkers, but these provisions are limited to
farm labor contractors and do not reach agricultural employers. 216
As it stands, MSAWPA only provides for enforcement of other
safety standards on the farm if the employer or contractor
explicitly advertised or promised such safety standards. 217
MSAWPA thereby incentivizes a counter-productive race to the
bottom, where agricultural employers are penalized for adopting
safety standards and farmers are rewarded for a failure to commit
to field safety.
Congress could amend MSAWPA in two different ways in
order to better protect workers. First, Congress could require a
warranty of safe working arrangements. In U.S. property law,
over forty states recognize an implied warranty of habitability. 218
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(3) (2006).
212. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Migrant Convention].
213. See supra notes 130-148 and accompanying text.
214. H.R. REP. No. 97-885, at 2 (1982).
215. This prohibition against violating "working arrangement[s]" exists for both
seasonal and migrant farmworkers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1822(c), 1832(c) (2006).
216. Id. § 1841 (regulating vehicle registration, insurance, and standards for
safety of farmworkers in transit).
217. Id. § 1821(f) ("No farm labor contractor [or] agricultural employer ... shall
knowingly provide false or misleading information to any migrant agricultural
worker concerning the terms, conditions, or existence of agricultural employment
. .") (emphasis added).
218. See BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW, 342-48 (2d
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Under this warranty, new houses are required to conform to
certain minimum standards of habitability regardless of what the
seller or builder states. 219 Likewise, the common law of contracts
requires work to be completed "free from material defects and in a
skillful manner."220 Similarly, MSAWPA could be revised to
establish an implied term of safe working conditions so that,
regardless of what a farmer advertises, certain minimal levels of
workplace safety must be satisfied. 221 These minimum default
standards for safe working arrangements could be derived from
existing state law examples, 222 and should include pesticide
application and field reentry standards, 223 pesticide disclosure
requirements, 224 safety training,225 and medical exams for at-risk
agricultural workers. 226
Secondly, MSAWPA's "working arrangement" provision
would more effectively protect farmworkers if it were interpreted
broadly. 227 MSAWPA's remedial nature counsels a broad reading
of its provisions. 228 Although courts have generally issued relief
for workers when faced with employer violations of rights
expressly granted by MSAWPA,229 the intent of the Act is to
protect this vulnerable class of farmworkers from abnormally
dangerous working conditions. 230  -If Congress amended
ed. 2004) (explaining that most states have either judicially or legislatively upheld
an implied warranty of habitability).
219. See, e.g., Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assocs., Inc., 727 A.2d 174, 180
("[H]ome builders and contractors are ... under a legal duty . . . to construct
habitable houses in a workmanlike manner.").
220. Caceci v. Di Canio Constr. Corp., 526 N.E.2d 266, 270 (N.Y. 1988); see
generally 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 612 (2008) ("[A]s a general rule ... there is
implied in every contract for work or services a duty to perform skillfully, carefully,
diligently, and in a workmanlike manner.").
221. Migrant Convention, supra note 212, at art. 70 (requiring that farmworkers
have safe working conditions in keeping with principles of human dignity).
222. See supra Part IV.A.
223. See ILO Chemical Convention, supra note 155, at 73-74 (requiring
agricultural employers to prevent, assess, and monitor farmworkers' exposure to
chemicals).
224. See ILO Safety Convention, supra note 150, at 246 (requiring disclosure of
risks resulting from new technologies).
225. Id. at 245; see also CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12986 (West 2001)
(requiring farmworker pesticide training by a certified instructor).
226. CAL. LAB. CODE § 9040 (West 2003) (requiring employer-provided medical
exams for farmworkers potentially exposed to carcinogens).
227. Wolfe & Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 705-06.
228. Id. at 706 ("Congress enacted [MSAWPA] because Congress recognized that
additional legislation was necessary to ensure a fair working environment . . .. To
read the 'working arrangement' clause [broadly] ... makes sense.").
229. Id. at 709.
230. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 2 (1982).
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MSAWPA's working arrangement provision to specifically require
a broad application, then it would govern pesticide exposure and
workplace safety, not just misleading advertisements. 23 1
Conclusion
Since MSAWPA's inception in 1983, little has changed in the
realm of farmworker regulations, and farmworkers remain
disadvantaged today. For the sake of farmworkers like the Lopez
family, agricultural worker protections can lie fallow no longer.
The 111th Congress has been preoccupied with national security,
healthcare reform, and financial regulations, and thus far has
ignored the need to mend the tattered patchwork of farmworker
protections. While it would be difficult to pass such reform in the
current political climate, meaningful amendment of MSAWPA
would greatly improve the finances, health, and bargaining power
of the nation's most vulnerable workers, who are employed in the
most dangerous occupation and provide our country's most
important resource. By modifying MSAWPA to eliminate several
large exemptions, to cover workplace safety regulations, and to
provide real enforcement mechanisms and remedies, the United
States can address the plight of more than two million workers
and ensure humane harvests.
231. See 29 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (2006).
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